best regards - Deutsch-Übersetzung – Linguee Wörterbuch

A common theme of the threads that I post on this subreddit is ensuring that a potential federal European Union does not centralise/unitarise through the back door due to ill-conceived constitutional features.
As I pointed out a few days ago in my reponse to Die Humanisten's vision of a European federal republic, a federal Europe that is too centralised severely risks its delegitimisation. Federal Europe, as an ethnically diverse polity, cannot afford to concentrate decision-making power in the hands of the political centre. Policy power has to remain decentralised and in the hands mostly of the state capitals, except for the few enumerated powers that, in the sense of actually practicing subsidiarity, cannot be satisfactorily deployed at the state level.
Recently, I stumbled upon a paper by Swiss academic Dietmar Braun of the University of Lausanne, dealing specifically with the differences between and commonalities of federalism in Switzerland and Germany. While Germany is a thoroughly unitarised federation with most decision-making power in the hands of the federal government and implementation being left to the states, Switzerland is considered a decentralised federation with powers distributed fairly evenly among the levels of government. What interests me is how Switzerland has managed to maintain such a high level of decentralisation, especially compared to Germany, and how the Swiss federal model is a much more 'natural' model for the EU than the German model. Moreover, I want to add more precision to the criticisms I directed towards Die Humanisten's proposal.
The paper written in German. Hence, I will first place the original German text and add DeepL's translation immediately below.
Origins of federalism in Germany and Switzerland

Der heutige Bundesstaat Schweiz ist aus dem Zusammenschluss von unabhän-gigen Kantonen entstanden, die zum Teil seit langer Zeit politisch miteinander verbunden waren (Linder 1999: 28). Obwohl von Anfang an Spannungslinien zwischen den katholisch-ländlichen Sonderbundskantonen, die stark föderalis-tisch gesinnt waren, und den freisinnigen, industrialisierten Kantonen, die eine Demokratisierung der ganzen Schweiz anstrebten, vorlagen, gab es doch gute Gründe, ein enger zusammenwachsendes Staatsgebilde zu schaffen: Auf der einen Seite herrschte, trotz aller kulturellen Heterogenität, bei allen Kantonen ein großes Interesse an einem einheitlichen Wirtschaftsraum. Die Schaffung der Wirt-schaftseinheit stand sicherlich im Vordergrund der Erwägungen. Auf der ande-ren Seite ließ das turbulente internationale Umfeld von 1848 die Gründung eines größeren Staatsgebildes als eine Art Schutzmechanismus vor dem Machthunger ausländischer Staaten ratsam erscheinen (Linder 1999: 32)
The present-day federal state of Switzerland emerged from the merger of independent cantons, some of which had been politically linked for a long time (Linder 1999: 28). Although from the outset there were lines of tension between the Catholic Rural Sonderbund Cantons, which were strongly federalist, and the liberal, industrialised cantons, which sought to democratise the whole of Switzerland, there were good reasons for creating a more closely knit state structure: On the one hand, despite all cultural heterogeneity, all the cantons had a great interest in a unified economic area. The creation of economic unity was certainly at the forefront of considerations. On the other hand, the turbulent international environment of 1848 made it advisable to establish a larger state as a kind of protective mechanism against the hunger for power of foreign states (Linder 1999: 32).

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator
Here, we can see a great similarity between Switzerland in the 19th century and the EU today. Marked internal heterogeneity, coupled with great interest in a unified economic area and the ability to stand up to foreign powers.

Einheit beruht in der Bundesrepublik auf anderen histori-schen Erfahrungen und Akteurskonstellationen. Wie Lehmbruch überzeugend zeigt (Lehmbruch 2002), vollzog sich die Einheit im deutschen Föderalismus im Spannungsfeld von “traditionellen Herrschaftseliten” und existierenden starken Länderbürokratien auf der einen Seite sowie dem “aufstrebendem Bürgertum” auf der anderen Seite, wobei Einheit vor allem “Rechtseinheit” meinte und sich dabei an das nationalstaatliche Modell der Französischen Revolution und den alles vereinheitlichenden “Code Napoléon” anlehnte (S. 72). Dahinter stand oftmals ein Begriff der “Kulturnation”, der auf “vorstaatliche” Kriterien und einen “ethnischen Nationenbegriff” verweist (siehe Linder 1999: 30, FN: 4). Die Auflösung der Spannung zwischen territorialen Sonderinteressen der traditi-onellen Herrschaftseliten und vor allem der territorialen Bürokratie und den wirtschaftlichen Interessen des Bürgertums, das Rechtseinheit als conditio sine qua non ansah, entstand dann der typische “unitarische Bundesstaat” und der “Exekutivföderalismus”. Dieser sah weiter eine starke Stellung der Länderbüro-kratie vor, akzeptierte aber die Rechtseinheit im Bundesgebiet und den Begriff der Kulturnation, woraus die starke Stellung des Bundes erwuchs.
Unity in the Federal Republic is based on other historical experiences and actor constellations. As Lehmbruch convincingly shows (Lehmbruch 2002), unity in German federalism took place in the area of tension between "traditional ruling elites" and existing strong state bureaucracies on the one hand and the "aspiring bourgeoisie" on the other, whereby unity meant above all "legal unity" and was based on the nation-state model of the French Revolution and the all unifying "Code Napoléon" (p. 72). Behind this was often a concept of the "cultural nation", which refers to "pre-state" criteria and an "ethnic nation concept" (see Linder 1999: 30, FN: 4). The dissolution of the tension between the territorial special interests of the traditional ruling elites and above all of the territorial bureaucracy and the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, which regarded legal unity as a sine qua non condition, led to the typical "unitary federal state" and "executive federalism". The latter also provided for a strong position of the state bureaucracy, but accepted the legal unity in the federal territory and the concept of the cultural nation, from which the strong position of the Federation grew.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator
What is readily apparent here is that the German model of federalism - that is, federalism as a means to the end of integrating the existing traditional ruling elites into a napoleonic style unified nation state - forms the basis for Die Humanisten's proposal on a European federal republic. What they propose is superseding the nation state and replacing it with smaller 'regions' as units of civic identification, with a common European identity serving as the overarching clamp. In other words, Europeans forming a single ethno-national identity who are in turn indigenous to their home region. On this basis, the German ideal of federalism conceives of Europe as a nation state of its own that necessitates "legal unity". This idea pre-supposes that there is a readiness among Europeans to give up their existing national identities in favour of a common new national identity as Europeans only which I strongly doubt.
Minority against majority?

Aber auch dem Schutz der kulturellen Eigenart der Kantone wird Rechnung getragen und zwar indem offiziell vier Landessprachen aner-kannt sind und der Bund verpflichtet wird, die einzelnen Sprachen zu fördern. Die Kulturpolitik ist selbstverständlich Sache der Kantone und nur in einigen Punkten, vor allem in den Außenbeziehungen, auch eine Sache des Bundes (Art. 69 BV). Wichtiger als diese verfassungsmäßig garantierten Rechte sind aber vielleicht die informellen Regeln, die in der politischen Kultur der Schweiz fest verankert sind, wie die Beteiligung der Sprachengruppen an Regierung und Gesetzgebung. Ein fester Sprachenproporz wird bei der Verteilung von Ämtern eingehalten. Dies heißt nicht, dass es nicht zu Konflikten zwischen den Sprachenregionen kommen kann. Hier ist wichtig, dass auch in der politischen Kultur und Praxis der Respekt vor Minoritäten und ihren Eigenarten gepflegt wird. Ein solcher Respekt musste sich dagegen in der Bundesrepublik nie ent-wickeln, da territoriale Minoritäten praktisch keine Rolle gespielt haben. Damit fehlt die bundesstaatliche Sensibilisierung gegenüber der “Peripherie”, wäh-rend sie in der Schweiz Grundlage des bundesstaatlichen Handelns ist.
However, the protection of the cultural characteristics of the cantons is also taken into account by officially recognising four national languages and obliging the Confederation to promote the individual languages. Cultural policy is, of course, a matter for the cantons and only in a few points, especially in foreign relations, is it also a matter for the Confederation (Art. 69 BV). But perhaps more important than these constitutionally guaranteed rights are the informal rules that are firmly anchored in Switzerland's political culture, such as the participation of language groups in government and legislation. A fixed language proportion is maintained in the distribution of offices. This does not mean that conflicts cannot arise between the language regions. Here it is important that respect for minorities and their characteristics is cultivated in political culture and practice as well. Such respect, on the other hand, has never had to develop in the Federal Republic [of Germany], since territorial minorities have played practically no role. This lacks federal awareness of the "periphery", whereas in Switzerland it is the basis of federal action.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator
Like Switzerland, federal Europe would be a federation of minorities. No single nation is in a majority which necessitates taking into account the sensitivities of various minorities in order to reach a consensus. In the German model, such consensus is unnecessary because as a unified nation, there are no minorities in the first place. The federation proposal by Die Humanisten is crucially dependent on there being a unified nation of Europe that, in turn, precludes the existence of minorities that need to be taken into account.

Dieser Respekt wird allerdings durch einen Umstand erleichtert, der in anderen heterogenen Gesellschaften wie z.B. Belgien, Nordirland oder Südaf-rika nicht vorzufinden ist: Die Schweiz zeichnet sich durch eine Nicht-Überla-gerung von sozialen Konfliktlinien aus: die linguistischen Unterschiede decken sich nicht mit den religiösen noch mit den wirtschaftlichen Unterschieden im Lande (Papadopoulos 1997; Kriesi 1995). Die französischsprachigen Kantone weisen z.B. häufig eine gemischte Konfessionalität auf, und sie zählen nicht systematisch zu den ärmeren Regionen des Landes. Die Kumulation von Kon-fliktlinien in den Kantonen würde sehr wahrscheinlich eine wesentlich explo-sivere Wirkung haben.
However, this respect is facilitated by a circumstance that is not found in other heterogeneous societies such as Belgium, Northern Ireland or South Africa: Switzerland is characterized by a non-overlapping of social lines of conflict: the linguistic differences do not coincide with the religious nor with the economic differences in the country (Papadopoulos 1997; Kriesi 1995). The French-speaking cantons, for example, often have a mixed denominationality [of faiths] and do not systematically belong to the poorer regions of the country. The accumulation of conflict lines in the cantons would very likely have a much more explosive effect.

This is probably the most interesting point of the whole comparison. Anti-federalists, and eurosceptics especially, often use the argument that Europe is too diverse to become a federation. And indeed, there have been federations that seemingly broke down due to internal strive facilitated by diversity, such as Yugoslavia. What should not be forgotten, however, is that not only does the number of successful multi-ethnic federations outweigh the number of those that broke down but that each case needs to be observed within its own context and that correlation does not equal causation.
Decentralised political culture vs partitocracy

Schliesslich soll noch auf ein letztes Strukturmerkmal hingewiesen werden, dass die Autonomie der Kantone unterstützt, nämlich die Rolle des Parteiensystems. Deutschland besitzt bekanntlich ein besonders starkes und zentralisiertes Parteiensystem, das den Föderalismus in vielerlei Hinsicht bestimmt (Beyme 1984). Die Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems ist zweifellos das wichtigste Element für die Aufrechterhaltung des unitarischen Bundesstaates, weil sich die Entwicklung der Parteisysteme auf den territo-rialen Ebenen durch eine “relative Kongruenz” auszeichnet (Grande 2002: 196) und weil die föderale Ebene in vielerlei Hinsicht durch das Parteiensys-tem “kolonisiert” und “instrumentalisiert” wird (Lehmbruch 1998; Braun et al. 2001). Das zentralistische Parteiensystem lässt dezentralen territorialen Kräften gleichsam keinen Platz. “Hinzu kommt, dass in den deutschen Par-teien die bundespolitische Orientierung eindeutig dominiert. Dies zeigt sich nicht zuletzt auch daran, dass die Bundespolitik in Landtagswahlen und bei der Bildung von Landesregierungen mitunter eine wichtige Rolle spielen” (Grande 2002: 196-197). Das Parteiensystem in der Schweiz hat sich dagegen weitgehend dem dezen-tralen Föderalismus angepasst und bildet gleichzeitig eine Stütze dieses dezen-tralen Föderalismus (siehe immer noch grundlegend Gruner 1964, 1969). Man kann durchaus von 26 verschiedenen Parteisystemen in der Schweiz sprechen (Kriesi 1995). Zwar sind die meisten Parteien landesweit organisiert, ihre Stärke variiert aber nach Regionen und Kantonen, und die Zentrale auf der Bundese-bene muss eher als ein Sekretariat der Föderation von unterschiedlichen Partei-faktionen verstanden werden, denn als harmonisierendes und lenkendes Organ (Grande 2002: 194; Neidhart 2002b: 125). Hinzu kommt, dass die Parteien in der Schweiz insgesamt eine schwächere Rolle einnehmen als in der Bundesrepub-lik, Belgien oder Kanada (Ladner 2002: 236). Die Schweizer Parteien zeichnen sich durch einen kleinen, wenig professionalisierten Parteiapparat, beschränkte finanzielle Ressourcen sowie eine geringe Zentralisierung und fehlende partei-interne Homogenität aus (idem). Die Parteien haben sich auf der kantonalen Ebene auf die jeweiligen lokalen und regionalen Besonderheiten eingestellt. Der Referenzpunkt von Wahlen ist dann in der Schweiz auch viel mehr die kanto-nale Politik als die Bundespolitik. Hinzu kommt, dass ein Posten auf der Bundesebene zwar den Höhepunkt einer Politikerkarriere darstellt, dass aber lediglich eine kleine Gruppe von Politikern die Möglichkeit erhält, dies anzustreben (Wiesli 1999). Zum einen funktioniert die Schweizer Politik immer noch stark nach dem Milizsystem, besitzt also im Verhältnis zur Bundesrepublik nur einen geringen Anteil von Berufspolitikern und zum anderen gibt es nur wenige Mandate auf Bundese-bene, insbesondere im Ständerat mit seinen 46 Sitzen, die sich hier anbieten. Da die Parteien auf der Bundesebene schwach sind, wird auch ansonsten nicht viel daran gearbeitet, politische Positionen auf Bundesebene aufzubauen. Dies zeigt, dass die Bundesrepublik und die Schweiz zwar im Hinblick auf den Kar-riereweg eines Politikers Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen, dass aber tatsächlich nur wenige Opportunitäten in der Schweiz bestehen, einen solchen Karriereweg auf der Bundesebene zu vollenden. Ein grosser Teil der Politiker bleibt so auf der kantonalen Ebene.
Finally, one last structural feature should be pointed out which supports the autonomy of the cantons, namely the role of the party system. It is well known that Germany has a particularly strong and centralised party system, which determines federalism in many respects (Beyme 1984). The structure of the German party system is undoubtedly the most important element for maintaining the unitary federal state, because the development of party systems at the territorial levels is characterized by "relative congruence" (Grande 2002: 196) and because the federal level is in many respects "colonized" and "instrumentalized" by the party system (Lehmbruch 1998; Braun et al. 2001). The centralist party system leaves no room for decentralized territorial forces. "In addition, the German parties are clearly dominated by federal politics. This is also reflected not least in the fact that federal politics sometimes play an important role in state elections and in the formation of state governments" (Grande 2002: 196-197). By contrast, the party system in Switzerland has largely adapted to decentralised federalism and at the same time forms a pillar of this decentralised federalism (see still fundamentally Gruner 1964, 1969). One can certainly speak of 26 different party systems in Switzerland (Kriesi 1995). Although most parties are organized nationwide, their strength varies according to regions and cantons, and the central office at the federal level must be understood more as a secretariat of the federation of different party factions than as a harmonizing and governing body (Grande 2002: 194; Neidhart 2002b: 125). In addition, the parties in Switzerland as a whole play a weaker role than in the federal republic, Belgium or Canada (Ladner 2002: 236). The Swiss parties are characterised by a small, less professional party apparatus, limited financial resources, low centralisation and a lack of homogeneity within the party (idem). At the cantonal level, the parties have adapted to local and regional peculiarities. The point of reference for elections in Switzerland is then much more canto-nal politics than federal politics. In addition, although a position at the federal level represents the culmination of a political career, only a small group of politicians is given the opportunity to strive for this (Wiesli 1999). On the one hand, Swiss politics still functions strongly according to the militia system, i.e. it has only a small proportion of professional politicians in relation to the Federal Republic, and on the other hand there are only a few mandates at federal level, especially in the Council of States with its 46 seats, on offer here. Since the parties at the federal level are weak, there is not much else being done to build up political positions at the federal level. This shows that although the Federal Republic and Switzerland have similarities with regard to a politician's career path, there are actually few opportunities in Switzerland to complete such a career path at the federal level. A large proportion of politicians thus remain at the cantonal level.

The party system currently present in the European Parliament is pretty much the opposite of what one would describe as unified. The different party federations (have) mostly compete(d) on state level issues with little to no effort to mobilise voters on the European level, at least so far. At present, this dynamic seems to be changing with the advent of new pan-European parties such as VOLT and DiEM25 but, nevertheless, the European party system is much closer to the Swiss system than to the German situation. The German model of partitocracy, on the other hand, relies on a unified political culture at the federal level that dominates the states.
Remember what I wrote on bicameralism two months ago. The Senate's task is to work as a party-deconstructing force in the light of parliamentary democracy. In Switzerland, the fact that the government cannot be voted out of office by the legislature means that the common government-opposition dynamic so synonymous with parliamentary democracy does not exist and party discipline is much weaker which in turn gives the individual legislator more leeway in advocating state-level causes. In my proposed federal Europe, the lower house of the legislature, the European Parliament, would encourage party discipline through the confidence mechanism, generally speaking weakening the link between legislator and constituency. This is important, because without party discipline, the parliamentary system is rendered terminally destabilised.
What the Senate with its specific setup does or is supposed to do is to provide an outlet for these non-partisan, constituency-specific concerns without jeopardising the basic mechanism of parliamentary government that is so prevalent throughout Europe and the EU especially.

Im Ständerat der Schweiz sitzen ja nicht Kantonsregierungsvertreter, die ans imperative Mandat gebunden sind, sondern Volksvertreter, die, wie in den USA, zwar von der jeweiligen kantonalen Bevölkerung gewählt wurden, sich aber keineswegs als Regierungsvertreter ihres Kantons empfinden müssen. ... Territoriale Interessen werden aber in beiden Kammern artikuliert und in die Entscheidungen einbezogen. Dies liegt auch daran, dass die Parteiinteres-sen aufgrund des dezentraleren Parteiensystems viel enger mit den kantonalen Interessen verwoben sind als in der Bundesrepublik. Es ist diese Verwobenheit (siehe hierzu Neidhart 2002b: 125; Linder und Vatter 2001: 100), die beide Kam-mern auch zum Repräsentationsorgan territorialer Interessen macht. Man muss sich aber klar machen, dass es sich in diesem Fall nicht um die Interessen der Kantonsregierungen handelt und die Konfliktlinien auf der Bundesebene auch selten die territoriale Machtverteilung als solche betref-fen. Es werden die Interessen der kantonalen Bevölkerung auf der partei-politischen Achse “Links-Rechts” repräsentiert. Territoriale Repräsentation meint im Bundesparlament nur die Vertretung der Mehrheitsmeinung in den verschiedenen Kantonen in bezug auf allgemeine politische Themen, nicht aber die Vertretung territorialer Interessen einer Regierung auf der Konflik-tachse territorialer Macht. Dies ist der entscheidende Unterschied zur Bun-desrepublik, aber auch zu Kanada oder zu Belgien, während Ähnlichkeiten mit den USA bestehen: In der Bundesrepublik vermischen sich im Bundesrat die “Standardinteressen” der territorialen Regierungen (Autonomie, Kon-trolle, Kompetenzen, Handlungsfähigkeit usw.) mit den parteipolitischen Interessen auf der “Links-Rechts-Dimension”, wobei die regionalen Inter-essen der Bevölkerung unterrepräsentiert sind.
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Tatsächlich ist der Ständerat weder ein Hort der parteipolitischen Opposition noch ein institutioneller Veto-Punkt für die konservativen Parteien. Im Gegen-teil: Es lässt sich zeigen, dass es selten zu größeren Konflikten zwischen Natio-nalrat und Ständerat kommt (Ossipow 1989; Vatter 1999). Im großen und ganzen herrscht eine relativ große Übereinstimmung in der Bewertung der politischen Themen. Dies liegt nicht nur daran, dass die rechten Parteien in beiden Institu-tionen die Mehrheit besitzen, sondern auch daran, dass nicht das parlamenta-rische Prinzip von Regierung und Opposition, sondern eher das für das ameri-kanische Präsidialsystem typische “checks-and-balances” Strukturierungsprinzip der Gesetzgebung ist. Die Schweiz besitzt ja eine Allparteienregierung, die dem französischen Direktorium der Revolutionszeit nachgebildet ist. Dieselben Parteien regieren seit 1959 im Schweizer Bundesrat die Geschicke der Nation. Anders als in den parlamentarischen Regimen kann diese Regierung nicht vom Parlament abgesetzt werden. Die Parlamentarier verstehen sich demnach mehr als Kontrollorgan der Regierung und nicht als Mitglieder von Regierungs- und Oppositionsparteien. In der Bundesrepublik nutzen die Parteien den Bundesrat, um ihn im parteipolitischen Sinne zu instrumentalisieren, obwohl er explizit als Vertretung von Länderregierungen gilt. In der Schweiz ist der Ständerat zwar auch von Parteiinteressen bestimmt, diese werden aber nicht als Regierungsop-position wahrgenommen. Dies verschafft gerade territorialen Interessen einen leichteren Zugang und mehr Aufmerksamkeit als in der Bundesrepublik, wo immer, wenn Standardinteressen der Parteien berührt sind, diese die Oberhand gewinnen auf Kosten der territorialen Interessen. Der schweizerische Ständerat ist insofern mehr territoriales Vertretungs-organ als der deutsche Bundesrat, aber er kann nicht die Standardinteressen der Kantonsregierungen vertreten, während es in der Bundesrepublik genau diese Interessen sind, die, wenn die Parteienkonkurrenz es erlaubt, Eingang in parlamentarische Gesetzgebung finden, nicht aber die regionalen Interessen der Bevölkerung.
Switzerland's Council of States does not consist of cantonal government representatives who are bound by the imperative mandate, but of representatives of the people who, as in the USA, were elected by the respective cantonal population, but who by no means have to feel that they are government representatives of their canton. ... Territorial interests, however, are articulated in both chambers and included in decisions. This is also due to the fact that party interests are much more closely interwoven with cantonal interests than in the Federal Republic due to the more decentralised party system. It is this interdependence (see Neidhart 2002b: 125; Linder and Vatter 2001: 100) that makes both chambers also representative bodies of territorial interests. It must be made clear, however, that in this case it is not the interests of the cantonal governments that are at stake and that the lines of conflict at the federal level rarely affect the territorial distribution of power as such. The interests of the cantonal population are represented on the "left-right" party-political axis. Territorial representation in the federal parliament means only the representation of the majority opinion in the various cantons with regard to general political issues, but not the representation of the territorial interests of a government on the conflict axis of territorial power. This is the decisive difference to the Federal Republic, but also to Canada or Belgium, while there are similarities to the USA: In the Federal Republic, the "standard interests" of the territorial governments (autonomy, control, competences, capacity to act, etc.) mix with the party-political interests on the "left-right dimension" in the Bundesrat, whereby the regional interests of the population are underrepresented.
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In fact, the Council of States is neither a refuge for the party-political opposition nor an institutional veto point for the conservative parties. On the contrary, it can be shown that major conflicts rarely arise between the National Council and the Council of States (Ossipov 1989; Vatter 1999). On the whole, there is a relatively high degree of agreement in the assessment of political issues. This is due not only to the fact that the right-wing parties hold the majority in both institutions, but also to the fact that it is not the parlamenta principle of government and opposition but rather the "checks-and-balances" structuring principle of legislation that is typical of the American presidential system. After all, Switzerland has an all-party government modelled on the French Directorate of the Revolution. The same parties have ruled the nation's fortunes in the Swiss Federal Council since 1959. Unlike the parliamentary regimes, this government cannot be dismissed by parliament. Parliamentarians therefore see themselves more as control organs of the government and not as members of government and opposition parties. In the Federal Republic, the parties use the Federal Council to instrumentalise it in the party-political sense, although it is explicitly regarded as the representation of state governments. In Switzerland, the Council of States is also determined by party interests, but these are not perceived as government op-positions. This gives territorial interests in particular easier access and more attention than in the Federal Republic, where whenever standard interests of the parties are affected, they gain the upper hand at the expense of territorial interests. In this respect, the Swiss Council of States is more a territorial representative body than the German Bundesrat, but it cannot represent the standard interests of the cantonal governments, whereas in the Federal Republic it is precisely these interests which, if competition between the parties allows it, find their way into parliamentary legislation, but not the regional interests of the population.

This is a very important observation. While in the Swiss model, both chambers of the legislature represent both general and regional interests, the German model fails at doing so. In fact, despite employing an upper chamber according to the council principle and not the senatorial principle, with the state governments being directly represented, the party system's interests overshadow the regional interests so strongly that the upper chamber underrepresents regional interests. Die Humanisten advocate a "Council of Regions" as the upper chamber that offers direct participation in federal politics to the regional governments which, coupled with constitutionally mandated centralisation of the political system, further strengthens the dominance of the federal level over the state level. It is, moreover, a scathing indictment of the current Council of the European Union, the body representing the member states' governments and modelled on the German upper chamber, insofar as it indicates that, were the EU to actually federate and maintain the Council, the development of the widely demanded strong party system in the European Parliament could potentially lead to sweeping centralisation through the Council which would transform the Council from a body that hinders integration to one that accelerates it. However, federalism can only be consolidated giving rise to an equilibrium of power.
Leeway in implementing federal laws
I previously was of the opinion that, ideally, a federal system ought to function in such a fashion that state and federal level are strictly separated from each other. The state level implements state laws, the federal level implements federal laws. Such an arrangement is, in fact, rare in Europe as opposed to the English-speaking world (USA, Canada, Australia). I believed that, for the federal level of government to remain limited, it was essential that it couldn't co-opt the states as administrative provinces for the implementation of its policies. The Swiss example as explained here seems to contradict this idea. Swiss cantons have significant leeway when it comes to implementing policies that the federal government has drawn up, not unlike EU member states:

Obwohl sich in der Schweiz eine ähnliche Verflechtung im Vollzug von Bun-desgesetzen herausgebildet hat wie in der Bundesrepublik und der Bund in der Schweiz eine ähnliche schwache Bürokratie hat, so funktioniert die Ver-flechtung doch nicht auf die gleiche Art und Weise. Die Kantone sind wesentli-cher autonomer im Vollzug und können es sich sogar erlauben, Bundesgesetze mehr oder weniger zu negieren (Linder 1987: 79ff). Dies hat verschiedene Gründe: – Erstens ist der Vollzug durch die Kantone nicht in der Verfassung festgelegt wie in der Bundesrepublik. Der Verpflichtungscharakter und damit der Zwang zur Kooperation ist somit formell geringer (Wälti 1996). – Zweitens sind die Bundesgesetze häufig und immer mehr in Form einer Rahmengesetzgebung verfasst, die den Kantonen einen weiten Interpretati-onsspielraum lassen. Die Wahl einer solchen Rahmengesetzgebung ist kei-neswegs freiwillig, sondern das Resultat der verschiedenen Veto-Positionen im politischen System: Der Bund versucht bei seinen Gesetzen detaillierte Formulierungen zu vermeiden, um möglichen Widerstand in Form eines Referendums zuvorzukommen (idem: 122).6 – Drittens bedarf es zur Ausführung eines kantonalen Gesetzes, auf das der Bund keinerlei Einfluss hat. Linder (1987) und neuere Studien (Spörndli et al. 1998; siehe auch Battaglini und Giraud in diesem Band) zeigen, dass Bundesgesetze im allgemeinen nur dann reibungslos und ohne impliziten Widerstand vollzogen werden, wenn es sowohl auf der Bundesebene wie auf der kantonalen Ebene einen Konsens über dieses Gesetz gibt. Andernfalls stellen sich Reibungsverluste ein.
Although in Switzerland a similar interdependence has developed in the enforcement of federal laws as in the Federal Republic and the federal government in Switzerland has a similar weak bureaucracy, the interdependence does not function in the same way. The cantons are considerably more autonomous in enforcement and can even allow themselves to more or less negate federal laws (Linder 1987: 79ff). There are several reasons for this: - First, enforcement by the cantons is not laid down in the constitution as it is in the Federal Republic. The obligatory character and thus the compulsion to cooperate is thus formally lower (Wälti 1996). - Secondly, federal laws are frequently and increasingly drafted in the form of framework legislation that leaves the cantons a wide scope for interpretation. The choice of such framework legislation is by no means voluntary, but rather the result of the various veto positions in the political system: the Confederation tries to avoid detailed formulations in its laws in order to avoid possible resistance in the form of a referendum (idem: 122).6 - Thirdly, the implementation of a cantonal law requires that the Confederation has no influence whatsoever. Linder (1987) and recent studies (Spörndli et al. 1998; see also Battaglini and Giraud in this volume) show that federal laws in general can only be implemented smoothly and without implicit resistance if there is consensus on this law at both the federal and cantonal levels. Otherwise, there will be frictional losses.

Law-making processes in the EU today already indicate that the member states, likewise, have great leeway in how they implement laws coming out of Brussels. Just think of GDPR or the recent copyright reform that now needs to be incorporated into national law. The member states have different approaches when it comes to doing that. Germany typically takes a long time to implement EU laws thanks to having to take into consideration the sensitivities of the state governments who are the ones who down the line are responsible for implementation. In Italy, on the other hand, the constitution says that European law is automatically part of Italian law; the specificities are left entirely to the courts. Naturally, as the EU does not possess any kind of executive power to force member states into submission, there are next to no repercussions for states that choose to postpone implementation of a law indefinitely.
Another factor contributing to the member states' leeway is that, in the EU, a large number of laws aren't directly applicable in the first place but are instead designed as framework legislation that is intentionally vague and needs to be fleshed out by the states.
I was previously in favour of a kind of federal arrangement that is best described as 'asymmetrical federalism'. Asymmetrical federalism is currently most prominently encountered in Canada. In Canada, provinces are allowed to opt out of federal programmes that they do not wish to be part of. As compensation, provinces that opt out get a tax rebate in order to be able to finance similar programmes themselves. Québec makes regular use of such arrangements in a number of policy areas. In the EU, asymmetrical federalism reeks of what some term l'Europe à la carte, that is member states picking and choosing which EU policies they want to be a part of. The UK is a brightly shining example of this. Hence, asymmetrical federalism is not very popular among European federalists. Here, the Swiss way may be an alternative and may indeed make good use of one of the hallmarks of federalism, namely allowing for innovation and local adaptation. There is no need for federalism as soon as the laws made centrally in the capital do not allow for local adaptation because all the advantages of cultivating legal and political diversity is precluded from the get-go.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Swiss model of federalism better suits the demands of the European Union than does the German model. This is because the Swiss model evolved in reaction to the growing needs of a common defence against potentially hostile neighbours as well as a common internal market. This is largely paralleled by the EU's own development that started as an economic community on the one hand, and as a defence community in the guise of NATO on the other. Likewise, many features of the EU are reflected in the development of Swiss federalism, such as the weak party system, the limited financial power of the federal level as opposed to the state level, the diversity of the population, and the focusing on maintaining state level autonomy.
The German model, on the other hand, presupposes a conditio sine qua non that is necessary for it to remain functional and not break apart under the weight of its centralist impetus: the existence of a unified nation that is content with limited regional autonomy because the focus is on the federal level anyway. Federalism in the German model is not an end in itself but the means to the end of uniting different territories with a common identity under a napoleonic unitary structure while accounting for the sensitivities of the traditional ruling elites.